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Medical Marijuana Laws and Opioid Overdose Deaths in the United States 
Gregory Schuster 
I. Abstract 
Several studies have found that medical marijuana laws reduce opioid overdose death 
rates. I attempted to confirm these findings using the most recent data available. I used state-
level death certificate data from 1999 to 2017 to compare changes in opioid overdose death rates 
following the implementation of medical marijuana laws in states that implemented such laws 
and states that did not. I found no significant difference in opioid overdose death rate changes 
following the implementation of medical marijuana laws. These findings do not undermine the 
primary justifications for legalizing medical marijuana, but they do suggest that legalizing 
medical marijuana will not solve the ongoing opioid epidemic. 
II. Introduction 
A. Background 
The U.S. has been ravaged by an opioid epidemic that has occurred in three waves. The 
first wave began in 1991 when pharmaceutical companies assured the medical community that 
prescription opioids posed a low risk for addiction.1 Doctors began prescribing opioids to 
patients with non-cancer related pain despite a lack of data regarding the risks and benefits, and 
opioid-related deaths increased accordingly.2  
The second wave occurred around 2010 with a rapid increase in deaths from heroin 
abuse. Individuals increasingly turned to heroin as early efforts to decrease prescription opioid 
                                                 
1 Opioid Overdose Crisis, National Institute on Drug Abuse (Mar. 2018), https://www.drugabuse.gov/drugs-
abuse/opioids/opioid-overdose-crisis. 
2 History of the Opioid Epidemic: How Did We Get Here?, National Capital Poison Center (last visited Jan. 12, 
2019), https://www.poison.org/articles/opioid-epidemic-history-and-prescribing-patterns-182. 
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use began to take effect.3 Heroin overdoses rose by 286% between 2002 and 2013, and 
approximately 80% of heroin users admitted to using prescription opioids before turning to 
heroin.4  
The third wave began in 2013 with the influx of fentanyl, a synthetic opioid. 
Pharmaceutical fentanyl is commonly used for surgical anesthesia and is prescribed to treat pain; 
however, almost all fentanyl on the streets is illegally manufactured, non-pharmaceutical 
fentanyl.5 Drug dealers typically mix fentanyl, a fine-grained powder, into heroin or counterfeit 
prescription pills.6 Fentanyl is extremely potent, 50 times more so than heroin, and has 
contributed to a staggering number of deaths in recent years.7 From 2013 to 2017, the annual 
number of overdoses associated with fentanyl increased from 3,000 to more than 28,000.8 
The severity of the opioid epidemic has prompted calls to combat over-prescription. In 
March 2016, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Preventions (“CDC”) published 
guidelines for prescribing opioids that contained lower dosage recommendations and more 
comprehensive recommendations on monitoring and discontinuing opioids than did previous 
prescribing guidelines.9 In April 2017, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
(“HHS”) unveiled a five-point Opioid Strategy which identified reducing the inappropriate use of 
                                                 
3 History of the Opioid Epidemic: How Did We Get Here?, National Capital Poison Center (last visited Jan. 12, 
2019), https://www.poison.org/articles/opioid-epidemic-history-and-prescribing-patterns-182. 
4 Id. 
5 Josh Katz, Short Answers to Hard Questions About the Opioid Crisis, NYT, Aug. 10, 2017, available at 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/08/03/upshot/opioid-drug-overdose-epidemic.html. 
6 Id. 
7 Fentanyl, CDC (last visited Jan. 12, 2019), https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/opioids/fentanyl.html. 
8 Josh Katz and Margot Sanger-Katz, ‘The Numbers Are So Staggering.’ Overdose Deaths Set a Record Last Year, 
NYT, Nov. 29, 2018, available at https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/11/29/upshot/fentanyl-drug-overdose-
deaths.html. 
9 Deborah Dowell, MD, Tamara M. Haegerich, PhD, and Roger Chou, MD, CDC Guideline for Prescribing Opioids 
for Chronic Pain — United States, 2016, MMWR Recomm Rep 2016; 65 (No. RR-1):1-49, available at 
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/65/rr/rr6501e1.htm. 
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opioids as a priority in responding to the crisis.10 In an October 2017 hearing before the Senate 
Committee on Health, Education, Labor & Pensions, witnesses from HHS identified two primary 
issues in connection with the opioid epidemic: (i) over-prescription of opioids and (ii) inadequate 
opioid addiction treatment.11 The perceived need to address over-prescription is common outside 
the federal government as well.12  
Some have suggested that the opioid crisis can be combatted through legalization of 
medical marijuana.13 If doctors prescribe marijuana to manage pain instead of opioids, the theory 
goes, fewer patients will develop an opioid addiction and thus fewer individuals will overdose on 
opioids. Some proponents of legalizing medical marijuana to combat the opioid crisis, however, 
have recognized the possibility that marijuana could function as a gateway, leading to further 
substance use and thus increased opioid overdoses.14 Although marijuana is a Schedule I 
controlled substance under federal law, 32 states plus the District of Columbia and Guam have 
what are called “effective” state medical marijuana laws as of November 2018.15 The purpose of 
this paper is to test the validity of the claim that medical marijuana may reduce opioid-related 
                                                 
10 HHS Acting Secretary Declares Public Health Emergency to Address National Opioid Crisis, HHS (Oct. 26, 
2017), available at https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2017/10/26/hhs-acting-secretary-declares-public-health-
emergency-address-national-opioid-crisis.html. 
11 The Federal Response to the Opioid Crisis, National Institute on Drug Abuse (Oct. 5, 2017), available at 
https://www.drugabuse.gov/about-nida/legislative-activities/testimony-to-congress/2017/federal-response-to-opioid-
crisis. 
12 See, e.g., Martin A. Makary, MD, Heidi N. Overton, DO, and Peiqi Wang, Overprescribing is major contributor 
to opioid crisis, BMJ 2017;359;j4792, available at https://www.bmj.com/content/359/bmj.j4792.full; Fred Muench, 
We Must Stop Opioid Overprescribing – Now, U.S. NEWS (Sept. 6, 2018), available at 
https://health.usnews.com/health-care/for-better/articles/2018-09-06/we-must-stop-opioid-overprescribing-now; 
Krishnadev Calamur, An ‘Overprescription of Opioids’ That Led to a Crisis, THE ATLANTIC (Jun. 23, 2018), 
available at https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2018/06/opioid-epidemic/563576/. 
13 Open Source: Could Medical Marijuana Help Address the Opioid Epidemic?, HOPKINS BLOOMBERG PUBLIC 
HEALTH MAGAZINE (last visited Jan. 12, 2019), available at https://magazine.jhsph.edu/2018/open-source-could-
medical-marijuana-help-address-opioid-epidemic. 
14 Marcus A. Bachhuber, MD, Brendan Saloner, PhD, Chinazo O. Cunningham, MD, MS, and Colleen L. Barry, 
PhD, MPP, Medical Cannabis Laws and Opioid Analgesic Overdose Mortality in the United States, 1999-2010, 174 
JAMA INTERN MED. 1668, 1669 (2014), hereinafter referred to as “Bachhuber et al. (2014).” 
15 States That Legally Regulate Medical and/or Adult Social Use of Marijuana, DRUG WAR FACTS (last visited Jan. 
12, 2019), https://www.drugwarfacts.org/chapter/medical_cannabis. 
 4
deaths by examining empirical evidence from the states that have legalized medical marijuana. 
My hypothesis is that the implementation of medical marijuana laws leads to a reduction in the 
number of opioid overdose deaths. 
B. Literature Review 
A 2017 literature review identifies ten articles that examine the effect of medical 
marijuana on the opioid crisis.16 The Literature Review provides preliminary evidence that states 
with medical marijuana laws have experienced decreased prescription opioid use, abuse, 
overdoses, and costs.17 
 Two of the ten studies examined in the Literature Review focus on the impact of medical 
marijuana laws on opioid-related deaths. Bachhuber et al. (2014) analyzed opioid overdoses from 
three states with medical marijuana laws prior to 1999 (California, Oregon, and Washington), as 
well as ten states that implemented medical marijuana laws between 1999 and 2010 (Alaska, 
Colorado, Hawaii, Maine, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Rhode Island, and 
Vermont) and nine states that did not have medical marijuana laws prior to 2010 (Arizona, 
Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, and New 
York).18 They concluded that the age-adjusted opioid mortality rate was 24.8% lower in states 
with medical marijuana laws and that medical marijuana laws may be associated with lower rates 
of opioid overdoses.19 
                                                 
16 Marianne Beare Vyas, RN, MSN, ANP-BC, Virginia T. LeBaron, PhD, APRN, FAANP, Aaron M. Gilson, PhD, 
MSSW, The use of cannabis in response to the opioid crisis: A review of the literature, 66 NURSING OUTLOOK 56-
65 (2018), hereinafter referred to as “Literature Review.” 
17 Id. at 63. 
18 Bachhuber et al. (2014) at 1669. 
19 Id. at 1670. 
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Powell, Pacula, and Jacobson (2018) reviewed treatment admissions for opioid abuse and 
state-level opioid overdoses from 1999 to 2013.20 They concluded that states with medical 
marijuana dispensaries experienced a relative decrease in prescription opioid addictions and 
overdoses compared with states that did not.21 Notably, these decreases occurred only in states 
with medical marijuana dispensaries, indicating that the degree to which medical marijuana is 
available is an important factor in reducing opioid-related harms. 
There are limitations associated with both of these studies. First, Powell et al. (2018) 
analyzed data that included deaths of any intent (unintentional, suicide, homicide, or 
undetermined).22 This is problematic because suicides and homicides, even those carried out 
using opioids, are not relevant to the opioid crisis, which concerns opioid addiction. It is 
reasonable to assume that many of the suicides and homicides captured in the data would have 
occurred regardless of access to opioids. 
Second, the studies do not examine data beyond 2013. This is problematic because the 
third wave of the opioid epidemic began in 2013. The proliferation of fentanyl significantly 
impacted the number and geographical distribution of opioid deaths. Thus, it is necessary to 
examine data beyond 2013 to determine the impact of medical marijuana laws on the opioid 
epidemic as it exists today. 
Third, the authors used state enactment of medical marijuana legislation as a proxy for 
use of medical marijuana by the state’s residents. This is problematic because states experience 
delays between passing medical marijuana laws and actually implementing them. For example, 
                                                 
20 David Powell, Rosalie Laccardo Pacula, and Mireille Jacobson, Do medical marijuana laws reduce addictions 
and deaths related to pain killers?, 58 J. HEALTH ECON. 29 (2018), hereinafter referred to as “Powell et al. (2018).” 
21 Id. at 36. 
22 Id. at 30. The primary analysis from Bachhuber et al. (2014) included deaths of any intent; however, they 
performed an additional analysis excluding suicides. The additional analysis revealed a 31.0% lower age-adjusted 
mortality rate in states with medical marijuana laws. Bachhuber, et al. (2014) at 1670. 
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Bachhuber et al, (2014) coded California as initiating its medical marijuana program in 1996,23 
the same year Californians approved the Compassionate Use Act of 1996; however, California’s 
medical marijuana program did not begin in earnest until 2005, when it began distributing 
medical marijuana identification cards in accordance with the Medical Marijuana Program Act, 
which was enacted in 2003.24 
While Bachhuber et al. (2014) attempted to control for these delays in one of their 
models, they assumed uniform delays between enactment and implementation across states when 
in fact states experience different degrees of delay.25 For example, while New York’s first 
medical marijuana dispensary opened within two years of the state enacting its medical 
marijuana legislation, Maryland saw a delay of nearly five years between enacting legislation 
and opening its first dispensary. 26 
III. Methods 
I analyzed the impact of legalizing medical marijuana on opioid overdose deaths using 
the difference in differences (“DD”) method. DD is suitable for this particular question because 
it estimates the effect of a specific treatment (such as the passage of a law) by comparing the 
changes in outcomes over time between populations that are subject to the treatment (the 
intervention group) and populations that are not (the control group). In this case, the effect being 
examined is that of medical marijuana legalization on the number of opioid overdose deaths, the 
                                                 
23 Bachhuber et al. (2014) at 1669. 
24 Patient, Primary Caregiver, Medi-Cali and CMSP Card Data, CAL. DEP’T PUB. HEALTH, (last visited Jan. 12, 
2019) available at https://www.cdph.ca.gov/Programs/CHSI/Pages/MMP-Card-Data.aspx.  
25 Bachhuber et al. (2014) at 1669. 
26 Jesse McKinley and Eli Rosenberg, First Medical Marijuana Dispensaries in New York Open, NYT, Jan. 7, 2016, 
available at https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/08/nyregion/first-medical-marijuana-dispensaries-in-new-york-are-
poised-to-open.html; Fennit Nirappil, Rachel Siegel, and Aaron Gregg, Medical marijuana has arrived in Maryland, 
and sales have begun, WASH. POST, Dec. 1, 2017, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/md-
politics/friday-appears-to-be-the-day-medical-marijuana-will-go-on-sale-in-maryland/2017/12/01/62d66dee-d605-
11e7-95bf-df7c19270879_story.html?utm_term=.67ae25baddb3. 
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intervention group consists of states that passed laws legalizing medical marijuana, and the 
control group consists of states with no such laws. Because states implemented medical 
marijuana laws in different years, I performed multiple analyses and grouped states according to 
the timing of implementation. 
 To calculate DD, I used the following formula: 
DD = (ȳTr,Post - ȳTr,Pre) – (ȳC,Post - ȳC,Pre) 
where ȳTr,Post equals the rate of opioid overdose deaths in states that adopted medical marijuana 
laws in 201727, ȳTr,Pre equals the rate of opioid overdose deaths in those same states in the year 
prior to implementation, and ȳC,Post and ȳC,Pre equal the average rates of opioid overdose deaths in 
comparison states that have not adopted medical marijuana laws in the same respective years as 
those in the treatment group. Assuming that the differences in opioid overdose deaths across time 
would have been the same in the treatment and control groups but for the implementation of 
medical marijuana, DD equals the change in opioid overdose deaths attributable to medical 
marijuana laws. Whether this assumption is reasonable depends on the selection of comparison 
states, which is discussed below. 
I obtained the opioid overdose death rate in each state from 1999 to 2017 from the Wide-
ranging Online Data for Epidemiologic Research (“WONDER”) interface to multiple cause-of-
death data from the CDC.28 I limited the analysis to 1999-2017 because ICD-9 codes were used 
to identify cause of death prior to the implementation of ICD-10 codes in 1999, and opioid-
related deaths are difficult to link across ICD coding systems. I defined opioid overdose deaths 
                                                 
27 I selected 2017 as the post-treatment year for all of the analyses despite varying implementation/pre-treatment 
years because I assumed that any impact of medical marijuana on opioid overdose deaths would increase over time. 
Thus, maximizing the post-implementation period should increase the likelihood of detecting an impact. 
28 CDC, National Center for Health Statistics. Multiple Cause of Death 1999-2017 on CDC Wonder Online 
Database, released December, 2018. Data are from the Multiple Cause of Death Files, 1999-2017, as compiled from 
data provided by the 57 vital statistics jurisdictions through the Vital Statistics Cooperative Program. Accessed at 
http://wonder.cdc.gov/mcd-icd10.html on Dec. 12, 2018. 
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as fatal drug overdoses of unintentional and undetermined intent (ICD-10 codes X40-X44) where 
an opioid was also coded (T40.0-T40.4, and T.40.6). This covers all overdose deaths where an 
opioid was involved, including those involving opium, heroin, methadone, synthetic narcotics, 
and other opioids. I included non-prescription opioids (heroin and synthetic narcotics) because 
the vast majority of heroin users have used prescription opioids prior to using heroin.29 While 
some people may have picked up heroin without first using prescription opioids, I assume that 
reducing opioid prescriptions leads to a reduction in overall opioid use.  
Because states implemented medical marijuana laws in different years, I performed 
separate analyses in which the treatment groups consist of states that implemented laws in the 
same year. I categorized states based on the year of actual implementation instead of the year of 
passing medical marijuana legislation. As a proxy for actual implementation I used the opening 
of a state’s first dispensary, the date of which can be found in state department of health reports. 
Accordingly, I excluded from the treatment group states with more restrictive medical marijuana 
laws that prohibit dispensaries. I further excluded states from the treatment group based on 
timing of implementation.30  
Selecting comparison states required some degree of creativity. Ambiguity and 
subjectivity in the selection of comparison units is a widespread problem in comparative case 
study research.31 In an effort to solve this problem, Abadie and Gardezabal (2003) developed the 
                                                 
29 Prescription opioid use is a risk factor for heroin use, NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE (last visited Jan. 12, 
2019), https://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/research-reports/relationship-between-prescription-drug-heroin-
abuse/prescription-opioid-use-risk-factor-heroin-use. 
30 I excluded Oregon and Washington because they implemented medical marijuana programs prior to the study 
period. I excluded California because it is unclear when it truly implemented its medical marijuana program. I 
excluded Alaska, Arkansas, Hawaii, Louisiana, Maryland, Missouri, Montana, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, 
Pennsylvania, Utah, and West Virginia because, although they have legalized medical marijuana in some form, they 
did not implement programs as of 2017.  
31 Alberto Abadie, Alexis Diamond, and Jens Hainmueller, Synthetic Control Methods for Comparative Case 
Studies: Estimating the Effect of California’s Tobacco Control Program, Working Paper 12831, NBER, 2 (Jan. 
2007), available at https://www.nber.org/papers/w12831.pdf. 
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synthetic control approach as a data-driven procedure to construct suitable comparison groups.32 
By assigning different weights to economic growth predictors in Spanish regions, Abadie and 
Gardezabal created a synthetic comparison unit with similar growth predictors to those of the 
Basque Country before it experienced terrorism in the 1970s, enabling them to approximate the 
per capita GDP path the Basque Country would have experienced in the absence of terrorism.33 
Inspired by Abadie and Gardezabal but wanting in certain technical know-how, I devised 
a crude data-driven procedure to construct comparison groups. I first narrowed down all of the 
non-implementing states to those that experienced similar directional shifts (i.e., increases or 
decreases) in opioid overdose death rates from year to year as did the treatment states’ average in 
the 4 years leading up to the implementation year.34 From that selection of states, I selected a 
combination that produced a nearly parallel trendline to that of the treatment states in the 4 years 
leading up to implementation. For example, the average opioid overdose death rate in Group 1 
treatment states (Colorado, Maine, and Michigan) increased from 2006 to 2007, increased from 
2007 to 2008, increased from 2008 to 2009, and decreased from 2009 to 2010 (the year of 
implementation). The Group 1 comparison states (Alabama, Indiana, Iowa, Montana, North 
Carolina, and Pennsylvania) are those that (i) experienced a similar pattern of increases and 
decreases and (ii) produced a nearly parallel trendline to that of the treatment states’ average 
across those years.  
                                                 
32 Alberto Abadie and Javier Gardeazabal, The Economic Costs of Conflict: A Case Study of the Basque Country, 93 
AM. ECON. REV. 113-132. (Mar., 2003). 
33 Id. at 116-17. 
34 I allowed changes under 1% in either direction to count as both increases and decreases to expand the selection. 
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The assumption behind this selection process is that similar directional shifts in opioid 
overdose death rates across years suggests similar relevant independent variables. This is a bold 
assumption, as discussed below in Section V. As the graph above demonstrates, however, this 
procedure yields treatment and comparison averages with relatively similar variations across 
years. 
The table below shows the different treatment and comparison groups: 
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Group Implementation 
Year 
Treatment 
State(s) 
Comparison 
States 
1 2010 Colorado35 
Maine36 
Michigan37 
Alabama 
Indiana 
Iowa 
Montana 
North Carolina 
Pennsylvania 
2 2013 Arizona38 
New Jersey39 
New Mexico40 
Rhode Island41 
Vermont42 
Ohio 
Pennsylvania 
Wisconsin 
3 2015 Connecticut43 
Delaware44 
Illinois45 
Massachusetts46 
Minnesota47 
Nevada48 
Idaho 
South Carolina 
Virginia 
West Virginia 
4 2016 Florida49 
New Hampshire50 
New York51 
Kentucky 
Ohio 
Pennsylvania 
South Carolina 
                                                 
35 Medical Marijuana Registry Patient Count, CHPHE (last visited Jan. 12, 2019), available at 
https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/sites/default/files/CHED_MMR_2001-2017-average-count-year.pdf. 
36 Maine Medical Use of Marijuana, Annual Report, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (March 2011), 
available at https://www.maine.gov/dafs/bbm/mmmp/sites/maine.gov.dafs.bbm.mmmp/files/inline-files/2011-
MMMP-Annual-Report.pdf. 
37 Michigan did not have dispensaries in 2010, but there was significant usage. 2011 Michigan Medical Marihuana 
Act Statistical Report, DEP’T OF LICENSING AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS (last visited Jan. 12, 2019), available at 
https://www.michigan.gov/documents/lara/Medical_Marihuana_Annual_Report_Statistics_FY_2011_409688_7.pdf 
38 Second Annual Medical Marijuana Report, A.R.S. §36-2809, ARIZ. DEP’T OF HEALTH SERVICES (November 8, 
2013), available at https://www.azdhs.gov/documents/licensing/medical-marijuana/reports/2013/az-medical-
marijuana-program-annual-report-2013.pdf. 
39 The Department of Health Medicinal Marijuana Program 2013 Annual Report, N.J. DEP’T OF HEALTH (Feb. 
2014), available at https://www.nj.gov/health/medicalmarijuana/documents/annual_report.pdf. 
40 Medical Cannabis Program First Quarter Report Summary, N.M. DEP’T OF HEALTH (May 21, 2013), available at 
https://nmhealth.org/publication/view/report/3125/. 
41 W. Zachary Malinowski, Summit medical marijuana facility submits new application for dispensary in Warwick, 
PROVIDENCE JOURNAL, Nov. 30, 2013, available at https://www.providencejournal.com/breaking-
news/content/20131130-summit-medical-marijuana-facility-submits-new-application-for-dispensary-in-
warwick.ece. 
42 Nina Keck, Behind The Scenes At A Vermont Medical Marijuana Dispensary, VERMONT PUBLIC RADIO, Jan. 4, 
2019, available at http://digital.vpr.net/post/behind-scenes-vermont-medical-marijuana-dispensary#stream/0. 
43 State of Connecticut Medical Marijuana Program Presentation, CONN. DEP’T OF CONSUMER PROTECTION (2015), 
available at https://portal.ct.gov/-/media/DCP/pdf/MMP/MMPCBACLE261515pdf.pdf?la=en. 
44 Delaware Medical Marijuana Program Annual Report, DEL. HEALTH AND SOCIAL SERVICES (2015), available at 
https://dhss.delaware.gov/dph/hsp/files/mmpannrpt2015.pdf. 
 12
 
IV. Results 
Group Treatment Period 
(years) 
DD52 
(deaths/100,000) 
Average Annual DD 
(deaths/100,000) 
p-value 
1 8 +5.07 +0.63 0.20 
2 5 -6.25 -1.25 0.18 
3 3 +1.37 +0.46 0.38 
4 2 -3.09 -1.55 0.12 
 
 Legalizing medical marijuana does not appear to have a significant impact on the rate of 
opioid overdose deaths. As the table above reveals, the average annual DD varied across groups, 
with Group 1 and Group 3 showing larger post-implementation opioid overdose death rate 
increases in treatment states than in control states and Group 2 and Group 4 showing smaller 
post-implementation opioid overdose death rate increases in treatments states than in control 
states. 
 The p-values for each analysis are large, indicating that the disparities in opioid overdose 
death rates can be explained by the play of chance rather than the presence of medical marijuana 
laws. I derived the p-values using the excel t-Test function, where one array consisted of the 
                                                 
45 Illinois Medical Cannabis Registry Pilot Program, Mid-Year Report – January 2016, ILL. DEP’T OF PUBLIC 
HEALTH (2016), available at http://www.dph.illinois.gov/sites/default/files/publications/mid-year-data-report-
january-2016-040616.pdf. 
46 Medical Marijuana Trust Fund Annual Report, MASS. DEP’T OF PUBLIC HEALTH (April 2016), available at 
https://www.mass.gov/files/documents/2017/11/02/mmj-annual-trust-fund-report-2016.pdf. 
47 Medical Cannabis Program Update, MINN. DEP’T OF HEALTH (April 2016), available at 
http://www.health.state.mn.us/topics/cannabis/about/update0416.pdf. 
48 Marijuana Establishments, NEV. DEP’T OF TAXATION (last visited Jan. 12, 2019), available at 
https://tax.nv.gov/MME/Marijuana_Establishments_-_Home/. 
49 Office of Medical Marijuana Use Bi-Weekly Update, FLA. DEP’T OF HEALTH (August 10, 2016), available at 
http://www.floridahealth.gov/programs-and-services/office-of-medical-marijuana-use/ommu-
updates/_documents/160810-bi-weekly-update.pdf. 
50 Therapeutic Cannabis Program 2016 Data Report, N.H. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (2017), 
available at https://www.dhhs.nh.gov/oos/tcp/documents/tcp-data-report-2016.pdf. 
51 N.Y.S. Dep’t of Health Adds Five New Registered Organizations to Medical Marijuana Program, N.Y.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH (August 2017), available at https://www.health.ny.gov/press/releases/2017/2017-08-01_mmp.htm. 
52 From pre-implementation year to 2017. 
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differences in opioid overdose death rates between 2017 and the year prior to implementation for 
each treatment state, the other array consisted of the differences in opioid overdose death rates 
between 2017 and the year prior to implementation for each control state, “tail” was set to 1, and 
“type” was set to 3. The p-values far exceed 5%, the significance level most commonly used in 
social science.53 Thus, the null hypothesis (i.e., medical marijuana laws do not impact opioid 
overdose death rates) cannot be rejected. 
 The graphs below show the opioid overdose death rates per year for the treatment and 
control groups: 
 
                                                 
53 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence: Third Edition, Washington, DC: The 
National Academies Press (2011), 251. 
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 Given the discrepancy between these results and those of Bachhuber et al. (2014) and 
Powell et al. (2018), I decided to conduct a second set of analyses, identical to the first in every 
respect except that the control groups consisted of all non-implementing states instead of only 
those selected via my crude synthetic method. It occurred to me that the selection method I 
devised in an attempt to avoid overly subjective and arbitrary comparisons may have produced 
just that. 
Secondary analysis: All non-implementing states as comparison groups 
Group Treatment Period 
(years) 
DD54 
(deaths/100,000) 
Average Annual DD 
(deaths/100,000) 
p-value 
1 8 +4.54 +0.57 0.44 
2 5 +3.18 +0.64 0.16 
3 3 +4.20 +1.40 0.07 
4 2 +1.77 +0.88 0.10 
 The table above shows the results of the secondary analysis. All four groups showed 
larger post-implementation opioid overdose death rate increases in the treatment states compared 
to all non-implementing states. As with the first analysis, however, the p-values are greater than 
5%. Accordingly, whether using only states with comparable pre-implementation opioid 
                                                 
54 From pre-implementation year to 2017. 
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overdose death rate changes or all states that have not implemented medical marijuana laws as 
the control group, there is no significant difference in the opioid overdose death rate between 
states with medical marijuana laws and those without. 
V. Discussion 
These results show that there is no significant relationship between medical marijuana 
legalization and opioid overdose death rates. There are several possible explanations for these 
results. First, it is possible that the gateway effect of medical marijuana (discussed in Section II) 
counteracts the effect medical marijuana may have on limiting initial opioid exposure. In other 
words, although fewer patients are being introduced directly to opioids via opioid prescriptions, 
they are still being introduced via a gateway effect of marijuana. 
Second, it is possible that the effect of medical marijuana on opioid overdose deaths is 
delayed. It may take years for individuals to progress from taking prescribed doses of opioids to 
injecting heroin, which accounts for a significant portion of opioid overdose deaths. The 
potential impact of medical marijuana on these types of deaths may not have manifested yet 
because most states have implemented medical marijuana within the last decade. 
Third, and most likely, the proliferation of fentanyl may have nullified any potential 
effect of medical marijuana on opioid overdose deaths. As the data shows, opioid overdose 
deaths have increased significantly after 2012, largely due to fentanyl use. Even if medical 
marijuana leads to a reduction in opioid use, the reduced number of opioid users may still 
experience more deaths in absolute numbers because of the lethality of fentanyl. Moreover, the 
illicit production of pills containing fentanyl may offset any reduction in the availability of 
prescription opioid pills that may occur as doctors shift from prescribing opioids to prescribing 
medical marijuana. 
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This study has several limitations. First, the control states may not be appropriate 
comparisons. I attempted to create synthetic comparison units using a crude data-driven 
procedure in an effort to avoid subjectivity and ambiguity in handpicking comparisons. It is 
entirely possible, however, that the similarity in the pre-implementation opioid overdose death 
rate changes between the treatment and control averages was a product of chance instead of 
similar relevant variables.  
Potential relevant variables include (i) the presence of state-level prescription drug 
monitoring program, (ii) the presence of laws requiring pharmacists to request patient 
identification before dispensing medications, (iii) the presence of regulations establishing 
increased state oversight of pain management clinics, and (iv) economic conditions.55 Using 
regression would have simplified accounting for these variables; however, there would still be no 
guarantee that these are the right variables or that they are properly weighed. 
Second, death certificate data, which is used to record ICD-10 codes in WONDER, may 
not correctly classify cases of opioid overdose deaths, and reporting of opioids on death 
certificates may differ among states. These misclassifications could bias the results in either 
direction. 
Finally, as discussed above, some of the states examined, particularly those in groups 3 
and 4, implemented medical marijuana laws one or two years prior to the end of the study period. 
It is unlikely there would be any observable effects of medical marijuana on opioid overdose 
deaths so soon after implementation. 
VI. Conclusion 
                                                 
55 Bachhuber et al. (2014) at 1669. 
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This paper presents evidence that medical marijuana does not have a significant impact 
on opioid overdose death rates. The results show that the goal of combatting the opioid epidemic 
does not justify legalizing medical marijuana; however, medical marijuana provides other 
benefits which may still justify legalization. Marijuana is an effective remedy for a wide range of 
medical conditions, and many states have concluded that the benefits of legalizing medical 
marijuana outweigh the costs.56  
The dramatic increase in fentanyl deaths suggests that reforming medical and 
pharmaceutical practices alone will not solve the opioid epidemic. In order to reduce the number 
of opioid overdose deaths, policymakers must find a way to prevent the illicit production and 
distribution of fentanyl. 
 
                                                 
56 Medical Use, NORML (last visited Jan. 12, 2019), https://norml.org/marijuana/medical. 
